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I.

INTRODUCTION

Parties adjudicate their differences before numerous bodies, including
judges, juries, administrative agencies, and arbitrators. One of the most
fundamental requirements of due process is that the adjudicators be free
from bias. 1
Much bias, however, is not overt. Rather, it results from the way in
which our brains operate. Every object is unique in a variety of ways. Yet
human beings cannot process an infinite variety of diverse characteristics.
Consequently, we classify objects into categories which enable us to
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1. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821-25 (1986) (holding that a
justice of the Alabama Supreme Court violated an insurance company’s due process rights
when he sat on a case which established precedent very favorable to the justice’s two
pending lawsuits against other insurance companies); Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, 409
U.S. 57 (1972) (holding that trial of an alleged traffic offender before the mayor of the
municipality in which the alleged offense occurred violated the defendant’s due process
rights where the mayor was responsible for municipal finances and traffic fines provided a
substantial portion of municipal revenues).
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process and interpret data. 2 We then perceive members of the same
category as being similar to each other and members of different categories
as being different from each other. 3
We categorize people for similar reasons and in similar manners as we
categorize objects, often stereotyping results. “[T]o cope in a complex and
demanding environment, people are ‘cognitive misers’ who economize by .
. . categorization, ingroup preferences, stereotyping, and attribution bias.
These processes, sometimes characterized as ‘cognitive short-cuts,’ occur
regardless of people’s feelings toward other groups or their desires to
protect or improve their own status.” 4 Thus, “stereotypes are unconscious
habits of thought that link personal attributes to group membership.
Stereotyping is an inevitable concomitant of categorization . . . .”5
People may be unaware of, and generally do not focus on, the fact that
they engage in stereotyping: ascribing group-level expectations to
individual members of those groups. 6 Indeed, stereotyping occurs among
people whose beliefs are relatively free of bias or prejudice. 7 Stereotypes,
however, “bias[] in predictable ways the perception, interpretation,
encoding, retention, and recall of information about other people.” 8
Researchers have identified two types of stereotypes: (1) descriptive
stereotypes and (2) prescriptive stereotypes. Descriptive stereotypes
attribute characteristics to members of a particular category or
classification. They can distort perception by leading the observer to
2. See Jerome S. Bruner, On Perceptual Readiness, 64 PSYCHOL. REV. 123, 123 (1957)
(discussing the use of certain attributes to differentiate inputs and place them into
categories).
3. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161,
1175-77, 1188-89 (1995); Henri Tajfel & A. L. Wilkes, Classification and Quantitative
Judgement, 54 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 101, 101-14 (1963).
4. Barbara F. Reskin, The Proximate Causes of Employment Discrimination, 29
CONTEMP. SOC. 319, 321 (2000) (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
5. Id. at 322.
6. See Marilynn B. Brewer, When Stereotypes Lead to Stereotyping: The Use of
Stereotypes in Person Perception, in STEREOTYPES AND STEREOTYPING 254, 254 (C. Neil
Macrae et al., eds., 1996) (defining stereotyping).
254, 254 (C. Neil Macrae et al., eds., 1996) (defining stereotyping).
7. See William T. Bielby, Minimizing Workplace and Gender Bias, 29 CONTEMP. SOC.
120, 121-22 (2000) (stating that individuals relatively free of prejudice can be equally as
susceptible to stereotyping as those with animosity toward a particular group); Anthony G.
Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L.
REV. 945, 951 (2006) (“Implicit biases are especially intriguing, and also especially
problematic, because they can produce behavior that diverges from a person’s avowed or
endorsed beliefs or principles.”).
8. Krieger, supra note 3, at 1188; see also James L. Hilton & William von Hippel,
Stereotypes, 47 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 237, 237-71 (1996) (reviewing recent psychological
literature with emphasis on the cognitive and motivational factors behind stereotyping).
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attribute conduct by a particular member of a group to characteristics
presumed to be held by all members of that group. 9 In contrast,
prescriptive stereotypes specify ways in which members of the group are
supposed to behave. They are often based on descriptive stereotypes and
establish norms against which observers evaluate group members’
conduct. 10
The existence of such unconscious stereotyping has been known
among psychologists and sociologists for decades. Beginning with Linda
Hamilton Krieger’s path-breaking article in 1995, 11 legal scholars have
focused primarily on the implications of such cognitive biases for the
substantive law of discrimination. 12 The business community has taken
notice as concerns over cognitive bias have been raised in large class action
discrimination lawsuits. 13
During the 1980s and 1990s, a large majority of state courts and
circuit courts of appeals established gender bias taskforces. 14 Among other
things, some of the task forces were concerned with “unconscious
prejudice.” 15 Perhaps the most pernicious effects of such “unconscious
prejudice” arise when it affects the outcomes of cases. Gender or other
characteristics of litigants and witnesses should generally not affect the
outcome of a given case. Finders of fact should not overtly or
unconsciously evaluate a claimant’s claim or a respondent’s defense based
on the party’s race, gender, ethnicity, or other irrelevant characteristics.
This Article presents a study of whether irrelevant characteristics of a
9. See Reskin, supra note 4, at 322.
10. Id.
11. Krieger, supra note 3.
12. See, e.g., Symposium on Behavioral Realism, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945 (2006); Samuel
R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and Antidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 477, 479-80 (2007); Tristen K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics:
Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
91, 99-100 (2003); Mark R. Poirier, Is Cognitive Bias at Work a Dangerous Condition on
Land, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 459, 466 (2003); Susan Sturm, Second Generation
Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 479-522
(2001); Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1138-1143 (1999); see
also Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1494-95 (2005)
(discussing the role of concerns with cognitive biases in broadcast licensing); Martin H.
Malin, Interference with the Right to Leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 7
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 329, 368-73 (2003) (discussing implications of cognitive biases
in interpreting FMLA’s prohibition on employer interference with the right to leave).
13. See Roger Parloff, The War over Unconscious Bias, FORTUNE, Oct. 15, 2007, at 90.
14. For an excellent review, see Symposium: The Federal Courts, 32 U. RICH. L. REV.
603, 609-14 (1998).
15. Lynn Hecht Schafran, Will Inquiry Produce Action? Studying the Effects of Gender
in the Federal Courts, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 615, 616 (1998) (quoting Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg’s foreword to the Report of the Special Committee on Gender of the D.C. Circuit
Task Force on Gender, Race and Ethnic Bias).
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grievant in an arbitration conducted pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement affect the outcome of the grievance. In the study, we presented
members of the National Academy of Arbitrators with four grievances
involving the discipline or discharge of an employee where the event
triggering the discharge resulted from a conflict between the employee’s
work and family responsibilities. We varied the grievant’s sex and one
other characteristic of the case in an effort to determine whether implicit
biases affect the outcome of the case. Does a man fare better on the same
facts than a woman? Does a married parent fare better than a single
parent? Do conflicts over childcare receive a more favorable response
from arbitrators than conflicts over eldercare?
Part II of this Article discusses the role of labor arbitrators in
adjudicating disputes over the interpretation and application of collective
bargaining agreements and their evolving role as adjudicators of disputes
arising under the public law. Part III presents the study’s methodology and
results. Part IV offers some tentative implications for adjudicators
generally based on the study’s results.
II.

WHY STUDY LABOR ARBITRATORS?

At first glance, labor arbitrators appear to be a relatively small and
specialized group of adjudicators. They are selected jointly by unions and
employers to resolve disputes arising under the collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) which governs the employer’s employees. It is rare that
a CBA does not have a grievance and arbitration procedure.
A grievance is a claim by an employee or union that the employer
breached the CBA. 16 For example, an employee who believes that he or
she was disciplined or discharged in violation of a contractual requirement
of just cause may file a grievance raising the claim. The grievance
procedure specifies a number of steps through which the grievance is
discussed at successively higher levels within the union’s and employer’s
hierarchies. When the grievance is discussed at the highest level of the
procedure and no agreement resolving the grievance is reached, the union
may demand arbitration. The CBA typically provides that the parties will
jointly select the arbitrator and that the arbitrator’s award will be final and
binding on all parties involved.
Although parties have the ability to sue to enforce CBAs, 17 such
16. Some CBAs also provide for employers to file grievances alleging that the union
breached the contract.
17. See 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2000) (“Suits for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States having
jurisdiction of the parties . . . .”); Groves v. Ring Screw Works, 498 U.S. 168, 172 (1990)
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lawsuits are usually impractical because of the time and expense involved.
In the absence of a grievance and arbitration procedure, a union is far more
likely to resort to a strike or lesser job action than to attempt to enforce the
CBA. Thus, traditionally, labor arbitration was regarded more as a
substitute for workplace strife than for litigation. 18 The Supreme Court has
referred to the employer’s agreement to abide by the grievance and
arbitration procedure as the quid pro quo for the union’s agreement not to
strike during the term of the CBA, 19 and Professor David Feller has
suggested that the no-strike clause and the grievance and arbitration
procedure are the true essence of the typical CBA. 20
At the heart of the labor arbitration system is the parties’ mutual
selection of the arbitrator. Because of such mutual selection, the Supreme
Court views labor arbitrators as “indispensable agencies in a continuous
collective bargaining process.” 21 According to the Court, the collective
bargaining agreement “is more than a contract; it is a generalized code to
govern a myriad of cases which the draftsman [of the written collective
bargaining agreement] cannot wholly anticipate.” 22 The arbitrator is called
upon to help resolve those disputes that the parties either did not wholly
anticipate, or for other reasons have decided to resolve through arbitration.
“Arbitration is the means of solving the unforeseeable by molding a system
of private law for all the problems which may arise and [] provid[ing] for
their solution in a way which will generally accord with the variant needs
and desires of the parties.” 23
Thus, according to the Court, “[t]he labor arbitrator is usually chosen
because of the parties’ confidence in his knowledge of the common law of
the shop and their trust in his personal judgment to bring to bear
considerations which are not expressed in the contract as criteria for
judgment.” 24 The parties have bargained for the arbitrator to “bring his
informed judgment to bear in order to reach a fair solution of a problem.” 25
Therefore, the arbitrator is selected by and accountable to the parties.
The parties’ expectations, as perceived by the arbitrator, are the primary
(holding that federal law provides a remedy for breach of a collective bargaining
agreement).
18. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
578 (1960).
19. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 248 (1970).
20. David Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CAL L.
REV. 663 (1973).
21. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596
(1960).
22. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 578.
23. Id. at 581.
24. Id. at 582.
25. Enter. Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597.
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constraints on arbitral decision-making. 26 The mutual selection process is
self-policing. Arbitrators who defy the parties’ expectations do not remain
arbitrators for very long. 27 Consequently, judicial supervision of labor
arbitrators is extremely limited. Courts must enforce an arbitrator’s award
as long as the award draws its essence from the CBA, 28 the most deferential
standard of review known in the law. Arbitral findings of fact are
completely outside the bounds of judicial review. “‘Improvident, even silly
factfinding’ does not provide a basis for a reviewing court to refuse to
enforce the award.” 29
This broad, unreviewable discretion that labor arbitrators have in
deciding cases provides a compelling reason to study their decisionmaking. Arbitral approaches to decision-making have a strong flavor of
legal realism. More than forty years ago, Sylvester Garrett, one of the most
distinguished arbitrators of his time, made the following observations on
the role of intuition in arbitral decision-making:
The creative and intuitive nature of this [decision-making]
function . . . has a counterpart in the conventional judicial
process. Judges are not often driven to given results in difficult
cases by the inexorable compulsion of concepts, maxims, logic,
and language. Almost always there is a choice among several
potentially applicable sets of principles.
One knowledgeable judge . . . has written that the vital
motivating impulse for judicial decision often is a “hunch” or
intuition as to what is right or wrong for the particular case.
Judge Hutcheson’s explanation of the opinion-writing process
will seem familiar to many an arbitrator. He went on to write
that, having reached a ‘hunch’ decision, “the astute judge, having
so decided, enlists his every faculty and belabors his laggard
mind, not only to justify that intuition to himself, but to make it
pass muster with his critics.” 30

26. See Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential
Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer,
44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1198-99 (1993) (“Parties select arbitrators who they believe will
resolve grievances in a manner consistent with [their] expectations. In turn, arbitrators, who
want to work again, generally do not disappoint them.”).
27. See generally Julius G. Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88
YALE. L.J. 916, 928-31 (1979).
28. Enter. Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597.
29. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001) (quoting
Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 39 (1987)).
30. Sylvester Garrett, The Role of Lawyers in Arbitration, in ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC
POLICY, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 14TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBITRATORS 102, 122 (Spencer D. Pollard ed., 1961) (citing Hutcheson, The Judgment
Intuitive: The Function of “Hunch” in Judicial Decisions, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 285
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Twenty-four years later, Mr. Garrett reiterated his recitation of this
model of arbitral decision-making and observed that since his initial
observations, many other arbitrators had expressly concurred with that
model. 31
The intuitive judgments involved in arbitral decision-making are
influenced by the values held by individual arbitrators. As James Gross
observed, “We as . . . arbitrators . . . use values to judge the conduct of
others in disciplinary cases and to determine what constitutes just cause for
discipline in those cases.” 32 These values, and their influence on arbitral
intuitive judgments, evolve along with changing mores in society. As
Richard Mittenthal, commenting on Gross’s paper at the National Academy
of Arbitrators’ Fiftieth Meeting, observed:
Over the course of time, changes occur in how we view certain
misconduct. For instance, in the 1950s, sleeping on the job was
often held to justify discharge for a first offense, while sexual
harassment perhaps a mere written reprimand. In 1997, the first
time an employee is caught sleeping on the job will prompt no
more than a brief suspension, while sexual harassment will be
held to warrant discharge.
How things have changed.
Widespread inattention to duty in the workplace seems to have
downgraded the seriousness of a first sleeping offense. And
widespread revulsion against the abuse of women has
transformed harassment into a “capital” offense. Thus, a change
in societal or workplace values alters arbitral value judgments,
(1929)).
31. Sylvester Garrett, The Interpretive Process: Myths and Reality, in ARBITRATION
1985: LAW AND PRACTICE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 38TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 121, 144-46 (Walter J. Gershenfeld ed., 1986) (citing, inter alia,
Gabriel Alexander, Reflections on Decision Making, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE
ARBITRATOR’S ROLE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 15TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBITRATORS 1, 7 (Mark Kahn ed., 1962); Peter Seitz, How Arbitrators Decide Cases: A
Study in Black Magic, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE ARBITRATOR’S ROLE,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 15TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS at 159
(Mark Kahn ed., 1962); see also Alex Elson (Chairman), Decisional Thinking, Chicago
Panel Report in DECISIONAL THINKING OF ARBITRATORS AND JUDGES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
33RD ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 63, 84-87 (James L. Stern &
Barbara D. Denis eds., 1980) (describing how in making their decisions, arbitrators are
influenced by their family, environment, formal and informal education and general
experience); Howard S. Block (Chairman), Decisional Thinking, West Coast Panel Report,
in DECISIONAL THINKING OF ARBITRATORS AND JUDGES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 33RD ANNUAL
MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 119, 124-30 (James L. Stern & Barbara D.
Denis eds., 1980) (noting how intuition plays a part in arbitrators’ decision-making process).
32. James A. Gross, Value Judgments in Arbitration: Their Impact on the Parties’
Arguments and on the Arbitrator’s Decisions, in ARBITRATION 1997: THE NEXT FIFTY
YEARS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTIETH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBITRATORS 212, 213 (Joyce M. Najita ed., 1998).
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which in turn affect our view of what is a reasonable penalty. 33
Mutual selection of the arbitrator by the parties legitimizes the role of
arbitral intuition and value judgments in the decision-making process. The
parties typically recognize the arbitrator’s wide range of discretion and the
major role that the arbitrator’s personal perspective on labor relations, as
influenced by her background, training, and ideological viewpoints, can
play in resolution of the grievance. Consequently, the parties often pay
attention to these matters when selecting an arbitrator.
John Dunsford has observed that, once selected to hear a case, an
arbitrator’s options in handling the matter are practically unlimited. The
only meaningful restraints are those tacitly conveyed by the parties as to
their expectations. As an arbitrator’s reputation and docket grow, a
reciprocal conditioning comes into play. The parties are presumed to be
familiar with the arbitrator’s conduct, rulings, and decisions and, by their
selection, represent that the arbitrator’s past performance is their expected
standard for the current matter. 34
Similarly, Edgar Jones has commented on the link between the
parties’ selection process and the legitimate role of the arbitrator’s personal
values in resolving a grievance: “[I]n this process of competitive selection,
‘his own brand’ was analyzed and adopted [by the parties] as their own
brand [of justice], whatever may have been their respective expectations . .
. .” 35
The view of the arbitrator as a purely private dispute adjudicator
reached its zenith in the Supreme Court’s 1974 decision in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co. 36 Gardner-Denver fired Alexander, who grieved his
discharge as violative of the CBA’s requirement of just cause. 37 His union
pursued the grievance to arbitration, where an arbitrator held that GardnerDenver had just cause and denied the grievance. 38 Alexander then sued
alleging that his discharge was racially motivated, in violation of Title VII

33. Richard Mittenthal, Comment, Value Judgments in Arbitration: Their Impact on
the Parties’ Arguments and on the Arbitrator’s Decisions, in ARBITRATION 1997: THE NEXT
FIFTY YEARS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTIETH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBITRATORS 212, 231-32 (Joyce M. Najita ed., 1998).
34. John E. Dunsford, The Role and Function of the Labor Arbitrator, 30 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 109, 112-13 (1985).
35. Edgar A. Jones, Jr., A Meditation on Labor Arbitration and "His Own Brand of
Industrial Justice", in ARBITRATION 1982: CONDUCT OF THE HEARING, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
THIRTY-FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 1, 11 (James L.
Stern & Barbara D. Dennis eds., 1983) (emphasis omitted).
36. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
37. Id. at 39.
38. Id. at 42.
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of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 39 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit held that the adverse arbitration award barred
Alexander’s lawsuit. 40 The Supreme Court reversed. 41
The Court held, inter alia, that a union lacks authority to waive an
employee’s right to a judicial forum for the employee’s statutory claim. 42
The Court also reasoned that the labor arbitration forum was ill-suited for
resolving statutory claims and that labor arbitrators, as privately-appointed
and privately-accountable adjudicators, were not institutionally competent
to resolve such claims. 43
In recent years, however, the role of the labor arbitrator has evolved
from a purely private interpreter of the parties’ CBA to a quasi-public
adjudicator, interpreting and applying the public law. 44 Ironically, one of
the major legal developments broadening the role of the labor arbitrator
occurred in the non-unionized sector. A number of employers required
employees, as a condition of employment, to arbitrate any claims arising
out of their employment, including claims arising under regulatory statutes.
Employees resisted enforcement of these agreements by bringing lawsuits
under the relevant employment statutes. All circuits that considered the
issue, except for the Fourth Circuit, relied on Gardner-Denver and its
progeny to hold that such pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate statutory
employment claims were unenforceable. 45 In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 46 the Supreme Court sided with the outlier Fourth Circuit and
held that an agreement contained in a securities exchange’s registration
obligating the employee to arbitrate all claims against his employer was
enforceable with respect to the employee’s claim under the Age
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (2000).
40. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 43.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 51-52.
43. Id. at 52-53 & n.16 (citing Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor
Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999, 1016 (1955) (“[The arbitrator] is rather part of a system of
self-government created by and confined to the parties. He serves their pleasure only, to
administer the rule of law established by their collective agreement.”)).
44. See Martin H. Malin & Jeanne M. Vonhof, The Evolving Role of the Labor
Arbitrator, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 199 (2005).
45. See Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104, 106-07 (5th Cir. 1990),
vacated, 500 U.S. 930 (1991); Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184, 186-87 (1st
Cir. 1989); Nicholson v. CPC Int’l, Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 230 (3d Cir. 1989); Swenson v.
Mgmt. Recruiters Int’l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304, 1305-07 (8th Cir. 1988); Cooper v. Asplundh
Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1553-54 (10th Cir. 1988); Johnson v. Univ. of WisconsinMilwaukee, 783 F.2d 59, 62-63 (7th Cir. 1986). But see Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 197-203 (4th Cir. 1990), aff’d, 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (holding
enforceable a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate a statutory employment claim under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
46. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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Discrimination in Employment Act. 47
Gilmer did not expressly overrule Gardner-Denver. Instead, Gilmer
distinguished Gardner-Denver as a case arising under a collective
bargaining agreement where the arbitrator’s authority was limited to
interpreting and applying the CBA and did not extend to resolving statutory
claims. 48 A major tenet of the reasoning employed in Gardner-Denver,
however, was the Court’s view that the arbitral forum was poorly suited for
resolving statutory claims. 49 This aspect of the Court’s reasoning relied on
the privately-selected arbitrator’s lack of institutional competence to
adjudicate statutory claims. The Gilmer Court flatly rejected that portion
of the rationale:
The Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. also expressed
the view that arbitration was inferior to the judicial process for
resolving statutory claims. That “mistrust of the arbitral
process,” however, has been undermined by our recent arbitration
decisions. “[W]e are well past the time when judicial suspicion
of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral
tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as an
alternative means of dispute resolution.” 50
Not surprisingly, encouraged by the affirmance in Gilmer, the Fourth
Circuit continued its pattern in arbitration cases and held that employees
covered by CBAs were required to pursue their statutory claims through the
CBA’s grievance and arbitration procedure. 51 The Fourth Circuit was
again an outlier, as all other circuits that addressed the issue held that
Gardner-Denver continued to control. 52 In Wright v. Universal Maritime
Service Corp., 53 the Court declined to resolve the issue of whether an
employee can be compelled to arbitrate a statutory claim under the
provisions of a CBA. The Court held, however, that if such an agreement
47. Id. at 23.
48. Id. at 33-34.
49. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 56-58 (discussing how “[a]rbitral procedures . . .
make arbitration a comparatively inappropriate forum for the final resolution of rights
created by Title VII).
50. Id. at 34 n.5 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 626-27 (1985)).
51. See Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 879-885 (4th
Cir. 1996) (holding that arbitration of employees’ Title VII and disability claims was
mandatory under the CBA).
52. See Penny v. United Parcel Serv., 128 F.3d 408, 414 (6th Cir. 1997); Pryner v.
Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 363 (7th Cir. 1997); Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112
F.3d 1437, 1452 (10th Cir. 1997); Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp., 117 F.3d
519, 526 (11th Cir. 1997); Varner v. Nat’l Super Mkts., 94 F.3d 1209, 1213 (8th Cir. 1996);
Tran v. Tran, 54 F.3d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 1995).
53. 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
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waiving the judicial forum is to be enforced, the agreement must be clear
and unmistakable. 54 In so doing, the Court recognized the tension between
Gilmer and Gardner-Denver, 55 but declined to resolve it definitively.
Most courts considering defense requests to compel plaintiffs to
arbitrate their statutory claims under their CBA have applied Wright and
found no clear and unmistakable waiver of the right to litigate. 56 Not
surprisingly, the Fourth Circuit has found clear and unmistakable waivers
and has dismissed employees’ lawsuits asserting statutory claims for failure
to take those claims through the CBA’s grievance and arbitration
procedure. 57 In Pyett v. Pennsylvania Building Corp., 58 however, the
Second Circuit held that even a CBA’s clear and unmistakable waiver of
the right to a judicial forum is unenforceable. The Supreme Court has
granted certiorari in Pyett and presumably will decide the issue left
unresolved in Wright. If the Court reverses the Second Circuit, “the
ultimate question for the arbitrator would be not what the parties have
agreed to, but what federal law requires . . . .” 59
Even if the Court affirms the Second Circuit in Pyett, the arbitrator’s
role will continue to broaden from private adjudicator of private disputes to
quasi-public interpreter of public law. Parties have expressly incorporated
the public law into their contracts through the inclusion of non54. Id. at 80.
55. Id. at 75, 77.
56. See, e.g., Fayer v. Town of Middlebury, 258 F.3d 117, 122-23 (2d Cir. 2001)
(finding the arbitration clause at issue was even narrower than the clause at issue in Wright
and therefore did not bar the plaintiff from bringing his First Amendment claims in a court
action); Rogers v. New York Univ., 220 F.3d 73, 75-76 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that CBA’s
arbitration clause did not contain sufficiently clear and unmistakable waiver of employees’
right to a federal forum with respect to claims under employment discrimination statutes);
Kennedy v. Superior Printing Co., 215 F.3d 650, 653-54 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that the
arbitration clause in the CBA did not compel employee to arbitrate his ADA claim, because
agreement did not explicitly reference ADA); Bratten v. SSI Servs., Inc., 185 F.3d 625, 63032 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that arbitration clause of CBA did not deprive district court of
jurisdiction to hear the merits of an employee’s ADA claim, because the ADA was not
specifically mentioned in the CBA); Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 172 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir.
1999) (holding that, in light of Wright, a CBA which did not specifically mention the ADA
or any other federal anti-discrimination statute posed no bar to a lawsuit).
57. See, e.g., Aleman v. Chugach Supports Servs., Inc., 485 F.3d 206, 215-17 (4th Cir.
2007) (dismissing employees’ lawsuits due to presence of “a clear and unmistakable
provision under which the employees agree to submit to arbitration”) (quoting Carson v.
Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 325, 331 (4th Cir. 1999)); Safrit v. Cone Mills Co., 248 F.3d
306, 307-09 (4th Cir. 2001) (dismissing employee’s Title VII claim because the CBA
provided that the parties would “abide by all the requirements of Title VII,” and that
‘[u]nresolved grievances under this Section are the proper subjects for arbitration.”).
58. 498 F.3d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted sub nom. Penn Plaza, LLC v. Pyett,
128 S. Ct. 1223 (2008).
59. Wright, 525 U.S. at 79.
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discrimination clauses in their CBAs, which commonly refer to Title VII
and other public laws. 60 Similarly, parties increasingly refer to the Family
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) 61 in their CBAs. 62
When employees and their unions grieve discrimination or other
statutory violations, the arbitration, with increasing frequency, is the
employee’s sole opportunity to resolve this claim. For example, in Collins
v. New York City Transit Authority, 63 the plaintiff was fired after he
allegedly assaulted his supervisor. He grieved and a tri-partite arbitration
board upheld his termination. 64 Plaintiff sued, alleging that his employer
discharged him due to his race and prior EEO complaints, in violation of
Title VII. 65 The district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment and the Second Circuit affirmed. 66 The court placed particular
weight on the arbitration award upholding the plaintiff’s discharge. 67 The
court opined:
[A] decision by an independent tribunal that is not itself subject
to a claim of bias will attenuate a plaintiff’s proof of the requisite
causal link [between the adverse employment action and the
allegedly illegal motive]. Where, as here, that decision follows
an evidentiary hearing and is based on substantial evidence, the
Title VII plaintiff, to survive a motion for summary judgment,
must present strong evidence that the decision was wrong as a
matter of fact—e.g. new evidence not before the tribunal—or that
the impartiality of the proceeding was compromised. 68
Other courts have reached similar results. 69 A number of state courts
60. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 516 (Alan Myles Rubin ed.,
6th ed. 2003) (“It is common for many agreements to include nondiscrimination and antisexual harassment [statutory] provisions.”).
61. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (2000).
62. See Jeanne M. Vonhof & Martin H. Malin, What a Mess! The FMLA, Collective
Bargaining and Attendance Control Plans, 21 ILL. PUB. EMPLOYEE REL. REP., Fall 2004, at
1, 3 (noting that parties are actually including the exact language from parts of the FMLA
into their collective bargaining agreements).
63. 305 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2002).
64. Id. at 117.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 118, 120.
67. Id. at 119.
68. Id.
69. See Darden v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 497, 504 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that
the district court was correct in according the arbitrator’s ruling great weight); Martinez v.
Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1056, 2005 WL 1485246, at *1, *5 (E.D.N.Y. June 23,
2005) (applying Collins); Norris v. New York City Housing Auth., 2004 WL 1087600 at *1,
*9 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2004) (also applying Collins); Clark v. UFI, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 320,
336 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that an arbitrator’s judgment should be given weight when
procedurally fair); Umpierre v. SUNY Brockport, 1997 WL 599314 at *1, *4 (N.D.N.Y.
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have held that employees who lost their grievances in arbitration were
collaterally estopped from litigating common law tort claims arising out of
the same set of facts. 70
If the Supreme Court upholds the Second Circuit in Pyett, its rationale
will probably be that the union lacks authority to waive the individual
employee’s right to a judicial forum for statutory claims. Where, however,
no such issue of agency is present, even the Second Circuit compels parties
to arbitrate their public law claims under the CBA. For example, in
Interstate Brands Corp. v. Teamsters Local 550, 71 Interstate Brands sued
the union under section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act for
damages resulting from an alleged secondary boycott. The CBA’s
grievance procedure provided for the parties to arbitrate “all complaints,
disputes or grievances arising between them involving questions of
interpretation or application of any clause or matter covered by this
Agreement, or any act or conduct or relation between the parties hereto,
directly or indirectly.” 72
Relying on Wright, Interstate argued that the strong presumption of
arbitrability should not apply because it was pursuing a claim under a
federal statute. 73 Interstate maintained that any waiver of its right to bring
its claim in federal court had to be clear and unmistakable. 74
The Second Circuit rejected the argument. According to the court,
Wright’s requirement of a clear and unmistakable waiver resulted from
concerns with the union waiving the individual employee’s right to sue. 75
The court reasoned that the Wright requirement did not apply to an
employer’s agreement in a CBA to arbitrate its statutory claims. 76
Accordingly, the court held that Interstate was required to arbitrate its
Sept. 26, 1997) (holding that plaintiff’s inability to discredit the legitimacy of the
arbitrator’s proceedings undermines plaintiff’s claims of employment discrimination).
70. See, e.g., Kelly v. Vons Cos., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763, 769-70 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)
(granting preclusive effect in fraud and negligent representation case to findings in labor
arbitration over facility closure); Bulger v. Lieberman, 667 A.2d 561, 562 (Conn. App. Ct.
1995) (making arbitration panel’s decision that employee resigned binding on her
subsequent wrongful termination suit); Taylor v. People’s Gas Light & Coke Co., 656
N.E.2d 134, 141 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (ruling that collateral estoppel arising from prior
arbitration precluded claims for malicious prosecution, tortious interference with contract,
and negligent hiring). But see Taylor v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 358, 36263 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (refusing to give arbitration award preclusive effect with respect to
statutory claims); Camargo v. Cal. Portland Cement Co., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 841, 855-56
(Cal. App. 2001) (same).
71. 167 F.3d 764 (2d Cir. 1999).
72. Id. at 765.
73. Id. at 767.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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section 303 claim against the union. 77
Not surprisingly, courts are taking a broader view of labor arbitrator
authority to interpret and apply the public law. Courts have compelled
employers to arbitrate grievances despite employer arguments that the
grievance would necessarily require the arbitrator to interpret and apply the
public law. 78 They are also enforcing arbitration awards whose rationales
are based on the arbitrator’s interpretation and application of public law.
For example, in Butler Manufacturing Co. v. United Steelworkers of
America, 79 the employer discharged an employee pursuant to a negotiated
attendance control plan embodied in a memorandum of understanding
between the employer and the union. The arbitrator determined that two of
the absences for which the grievant had been charged were FMLAprotected and ordered the grievant reinstated with half back pay. 80 The
employer sued to vacate the award. 81
The union argued that the award drew its essence from the contract
and cited a provision of the agreement that stated, “Butler Manufacturing
Company offers equal opportunity for employment, advancement in
employment, and continuation of employment to all qualified individuals in
accordance with the provisions of law and in accordance with the
provisions of this Agreement for the represented employees covered by
it.” 82 The district court, however, determined the quoted language to be
“nothing but boilerplate anti-discrimination commitments that did not
necessarily pull the FMLA into the agreement,” 83 and held that the
arbitrator exceeded her authority by relying on the FMLA. The Seventh
Circuit reversed. The court reasoned:
If there was some kind of “clear statement” rule that applied to
CBAs and to the match between a CBA and an arbitrator’s
authority, perhaps [the district court’s analysis] would have been
right. But there is no such rule. Instead . . . the standard asks
only whether the arbitrator’s interpretation can rationally be
linked to the CBA. Here, a broader look . . . demonstrates that
the arbitrator’s award did draw its essence from the parties’
agreement. Article 2, paragraph 13 . . . does not say only that
77. Interstate Brands Corp., 167 F.3d at 767.
78. See Cal. Correctional Peace Officers Ass’n v. State, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 717, 726 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2006) (holding that arbitration was not precluded even though the issue in dispute
was governed by statute); Knipp v. Lawrence County Bd. of Comm’rs, No. 04CA34, slip
op. at 3 (Ohio Ct. App. June 14, 2005) (finding that pursuant to a CBA, an employee was
obligated to grieve and arbitrate her claim that her discharge violated a state statute).
79. 336 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2003).
80. Id. at 632.
81. Id. at 631.
82. Id. at 633.
83. Id.
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there will be “equal opportunity for employment . . . in
accordance with the provisions of this Agreement . . .” In the
ellipsis between the word “employment” and the last phrase
comes the phrase “in accordance with the provisions of law.”
We have no reason to think that this reference to external law is
either surplusage or “mere boilerplate.” We find that Article 2,
paragraph 13 conferred on the arbitrator the authority to consider
the FMLA. 84
The First Circuit has taken an even more expansive view of arbitral
authority. In Coastal Oil of New England, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 25, 85 the
CBA provided, inter alia, that the employer would either maintain
workers’ compensation insurance or provide injured employees with the
same benefits as provided for in the Massachusetts worker’s compensation
statute. 86 The CBA covered only one of the employer’s three facilities. 87
The same union represented the employees at the other two facilities, but
each facility had its own CBA. 88
An employee covered by the CBA was injured on the job. 89
Following his recovery, he sought reinstatement but was advised that there
were no openings. 90 The union and employer agreed that the employee
would be reinstated to the next available opening. 91 Subsequently, the
employee learned of an opening at one of the other two facilities. 92 When
the employer refused to award him that position, he grieved and the union
took the claim to arbitration. 93
The arbitrator, relying on the Massachusetts Worker’s Compensation
Law, ordered the employer to reinstate the grievant to the position at the
other facility which was covered by a different CBA. 94 The First Circuit
upheld the arbitrator’s authority to do so. 95 Relying on Gilmer and its
progeny, the court gave the employer’s attack on the arbitrator’s authority
short shrift:
How can the arbitrator, in determining whether appellant lived up
to the contractual obligations mandated by . . . the Revere
Agreement, fail to address whether the provisions of the
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 633-34 (citation omitted).
134 F.3d 466, 468 (1st Cir. 1998).
Id. at 468.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Coastal Oil of New England, Inc.,134 F.3d at 468.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 470.
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Massachusetts Worker’s Compensation Law, incorporated into
that agreement . . . have been met?
The response to this question as well as to appellant’s
challenge to the arbitrator’s authority to interpret the
aforementioned Massachusetts statute is self-evident. Obviously,
the arbitrator acted properly and within the scope of his delegated
authority. We can perceive of no valid reason why the parties
could not also agree to have statutory rights enforced before an
arbitral forum. 96
Thus, labor arbitrators have evolved from their original roles as purely
private adjudicators of the parties’ private law, as expressed in their
collective bargaining agreement, to quasi-public officers interpreting and
applying the public law. This evolving role of labor arbitrators provides a
further basis for studying their decision-making.
III. THE STUDY
A.

Background

More than ninety percent of all CBAs require just cause for discipline
and discharge. Employees who believe that they have been disciplined or
discharged without cause may file grievances challenging those actions.
An arbitrator might sustain a grievance completely, ordering the employer
to reinstate the employee if discharged and to make the employee whole for
lost wages and benefits. The arbitrator may deny the grievance, allowing
the discipline or discharge to stand. The arbitrator may also sustain the
grievance in part, reducing the discipline to a lesser penalty.
Because of the effects that evolving societal mores and practices can
have on arbitral interpretations of just cause, we chose to provide
arbitrators with four grievances where the discipline or discharge arose out
of a work-family conflict. The demographic revolution in the workplace
has become an accepted fact of life. The 1950s model of a two-parent
household in which only one parent worked outside the home has long
faded into obscurity. Today a child raised in such a household is in a
distinct minority. In March 2002, only 23.7% of all children in the United
States lived with two parents and had only one parent in the labor force. 97
96. Id. at 469-70. But see Sheriff of Suffolk County v. AFSCME Council 93, 856
N.E.2d 194, 198 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (holding that an arbitrator lacked authority to
interpret and rely on a state statute as the basis for decision).
97. See JASON FIELDS, CHILDREN’S LIVING ARRANGEMENTS AND CHARACTERISTICS:
MARCH 2002, at 9 tbl.4 (U.S. Census Bureau 2003) (showing that in 20.7% of families with
two parents the father was the sole parent in the workforce, and in 3.0% of such families the
mother was the only parent in the workforce).

2008]

COGNITIVE BIAS AND ADJUDICATION

191

The predominance of single-parent and dual-worker households has
greatly increased the tension that employees feel between responsibilities to
their jobs and responsibilities to their families. For example, it has been
estimated that one in three working families with children under six relies
on split shifts for childcare (i.e., parents working different shifts so that
each can care for the child while the other is at work). 98 Additionally, an
increasing number of workers—an estimated one-third of workers in a
recent study—are responsible for caring for elderly parents and in-laws. 99
The external law has responded to these demographic changes in
many ways. Most visible is the FMLA. Other legal developments,
although not as visible as the FMLA, nevertheless reflect recognition of
these societal changes. For example, in Prickett v. Circuit Science, Inc., 100
the Minnesota Supreme Court overruled prior case law and held that a
single father discharged for refusing a shift change because he could not
find childcare was entitled to unemployment benefits. 101 The court rejected
the employer’s argument that the claimant was disqualified because he had
been terminated for willful misconduct. 102 The court wrote:
[W]e hold that the employee’s failure to report to a new shift
assignment because of an inability to obtain adequate care for the
employee’s dependent child does not constitute misconduct
justifying denial of unemployment compensation benefits. To
hold otherwise would be to ignore significant facts about the
world today. In 1990, almost 60% of children in Minnesota lived
in families in which both parents worked outside the home.
Another 9.3% lived in families with one working parent. If
Prickett had left his child without supervision, he would have
been subject to criminal sanctions. He also could have been
sanctioned for failure to support Kyle. Under these limited
circumstances, Prickett seemed to have no choice but to do as he
did and we cannot hold that he engaged in “wilful
misconduct.” 103
A review of published arbitration awards finds no consensus of
arbitral opinion in handling discipline and discharge grievances arising out

98. See Harriet B. Presser, Toward a 24-Hour Economy, 284 SCI. 1778 (June 11, 1999)
(relying on statistics from the Current Population Survey performed in 1997 in discussing
the impact on families of the increased prevalence of nonstandard work schedules).
99. See JAMES T. BOND ET AL., HIGHLIGHTS OF THE NATIONAL STUDY OF THE CHANGING
WORKFORCE 29 (2002) (examining survey results on the changing conditions of the
American workforce).
100. 518 N.W.2d 602 (Minn. 1994).
101. Id. at 605.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 605-06 (citations omitted).
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of work-family conflicts. For example, in Town of Stratford, 104 a police
officer refused an order that she report for duty at noon instead of her
scheduled 4:00 p.m. start time because she was unable to get childcare to
cover the early start. 105 The town suspended her for five days for
insubordination. 106 The arbitrator denied her grievance, finding that the
absence of childcare was not analogous to illness, which would have
justified refusal of the order. 107
Similarly, in Washtenaw County, 108 the grievant was an attorney with
the County Friend of the Court. 109 She sought a leave covering six weeks
during the summer when she and her common law husband would have
custody of her husband’s two young daughters. 110 The Friend of the Court
denied the request because he was new and would be carrying out
numerous changes and could not afford the absence of an attorney with the
grievant’s capabilities and experience. 111 She proposed working three days
per week or taking files home to work on and reporting for work whenever
she could.” 112 The Friend of the Court denied both requests. 113 The
grievant did not appear for work on Monday of the first week that she and
her husband had the girls. 114 The Friend of the Court allowed her to use her
last sick day for that Monday and ordered her to report for work on
Tuesday. 115 The grievant did not and she was fired. 116
The arbitrator denied her grievance. 117 He held that the employer’s
denial of her leave requests was not arbitrary or capricious, opining that the
denial “seem[ed] based upon a fair analysis of the work commitment that
was expected of the grievant . . . . [I]t would appear that an attorney of the
grievant’s extraordinary capabilities and admirable work habits would be
sorely missed and put the department at a great disadvantage were her
leave granted.” 118
Finding the leave of absence denial proper, he also upheld her

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

97 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 513 (1991) (Stewart, Arb.).
Id. at 513.
Id.
Id. at 514.
80 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 513 (1982) (Daniel, Arb.).
Id. at 513.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 514.
Id.
Washtenaw County, 80 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 513, 514 (1982) (Daniel, Arb.).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 516.
Id. at 515.
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discharge. 119 In reaching this conclusion, the arbitrator stated:
What possible response could an employer have in such a
situation other than termination of the employee. To permit her
to continue at her whim as to which days she would work or not
would simply be accepting her terms of employment and, in
effect, granting the leave of absence which already had been
denied. There was absolutely no assurance from the grievant of
any absolute commitment to her employment but rather that it
would all depend upon her ability to get a babysitter or make
some other arrangements. None of the alternatives were viable in
the eyes of the employer and properly so. 120
The arbitrator further opined:
There is no doubt whatsoever in this case that the grievant was
acting out of unselfish and commendable motivation to provide
for two young children a type of stability that they had not
experienced before. The grievant at the time was certainly
capable and able to weigh in the balance her employment against
the urgency of her personal problems. She made her choice at
that time and who is to say it was not the wisest. However,
having made that decision she lacks standing to complain about
the loss of the employment. 121
In contrast, in Jones Operation & Maintenance Co., 122 the grievant
had been starting her shift at 9:00 a.m. to accommodate her childcare
needs. She took maternity leave. 123 Upon her return, the employer
required that she begin her shift at 7:30 a.m. 124 She was unable to find
childcare for that shift and was terminated. 125 The arbitrator sustained her
grievance because the employer was unable to justify its denial of the
request for schedule accommodation. 126
In Rochester Psychiatric Center, 127 a single parent worked the 3:00 11:20 p.m. shift. Mandatory overtime rotated among all employees.128 The
grievant knew when her name reached the top of the rotation list but did
not know when she would be tapped for overtime. 129 Determination of the

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 516.
Washtenaw County, 80 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 513, 515 (1982) (Daniel, Arb.).
Id. at 516.
93 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 239 (1989) (Schwartz, Arb.).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 239-40.
Id. at 243.
87 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 725, 726 (1986) (Babiskin, Arb.).
Id. at 726.
Id.
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need for overtime, usually a second eight hour shift, was made late in the
shift and grievant was unable to obtain childcare on such short notice. 130
Grievant refused to work the overtime and was suspended. 131 She refused a
second time and was suspended again. 132 When she refused a third time,
the employer fired her. 133
The arbitrator opined, “No person should be forced to choose between
his children or his livelihood.” 134 He further stated, “No arbitrator on earth
would sustain discharge on the facts of this case.” 135 He reduced the
discharge to a one dollar fine and required the parties to agree on three days
per month, arranged thirty days in advance, during which the grievant
would be available to work overtime. 136
A systematic survey of all published arbitration awards found widely
divergent approaches to discipline and discharge grievances where the
incident giving rise to the adverse employment action arose out of a workfamily conflict. 137 Many of the reported awards are difficult to reconcile, at
least on their face. Some appear to regard family responsibilities as
personal to the employee and as matters that the employer has a right to
expect not to interfere with job performance. Others seem to regard family
responsibilities as a relevant factor that employers must consider in
assessing discipline and seem to find implicit in the just cause requirement
a requirement that employers attempt to accommodate such
responsibilities.
The role of societal values and arbitral intuition in arbitrator decisionmaking begs the question of what factors may explain the divergent results
in the published arbitration awards dealing with discipline and discharge
resulting from work-family conflicts. Specifically, although consideration
of grievances with family-work conflict at their core should not be affected
by the gender of the grievant, there is reason to suspect that it might. The
typical finding in the vast social psychology literature on stereotyping is
that individual members of stereotyped groups are judged consistently with
group stereotypes. 138 With regard to gender, this means that individual
130. Id. at 726-27.
131. Id. at 726.
132. Id. at 727.
133. Rochester Psychiatric Center, 87 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 725, 727 (1986) (Babiskin,
Arb.).
134. Id. (emphasis omitted).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 728.
137. MARTIN H. MALIN ET AL., WORK-FAMILY CONFLICT UNION STYLE: LABOR
ARBITRATIONS INVOLVING FAMILY CARE (American University Center for Worklife Law,
2004), available at http://www.uchastings.edu/site_files/WLL/conflictunionstyle.pdf.
138. See generally DAVID J. SCHNEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF STEREOTYPING (2004)
(focusing on the development of categorical stereotypes and their effects on society);
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women tend to be judged as less aggressive, more emotional, more
nurturing, less competent in workplace settings, and less capable in
leadership roles than comparable men. 139
Furthermore, parental status affects judgment about workplace
competence as well. Studies show that students perceive employed
mothers and fathers as differentially effective in the workplace. Numerous
researchers have documented that college students perceive employed
mothers as less nurturing, less professionally competent, less reliable, and
less committed to the workforce than single women and fathers. 140 In
Brewer, supra note 6, at 3 (defining stereotyping).
139. See generally Monica Biernat & Diane Kobrynowicz, Gender- and Race-based
Standards of Competence: Lower Minimum Standards but Higher Ability Standards for
Devalued Groups, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 544, 544-57 (1997) (discussing that
members of devalued groups are judged on lower minimum standards and must work harder
to demonstrate their ability); Jennifer Boldry et al., Gender Stereotypes and the Evaluation
of Men and Women in Military Training, 57 J. SOC. ISS. 689, 689-705 (2001) (linking the
lower evaluations of women involved in military training to gender stereotypes); Kay
Deaux, From Individual Differences to Social Categories: Analysis of a Decade’s Research
on Gender, 39 AM. PSYCHOL. 105, 105-16 (1984) (describing research showing the
prevalence of gender stereotypes, including traits that are more likely to be ascribed to
women); Alice H. Eagly & V. J. Steffen, Gender Stereotypes Stem from the Distribution of
Women and Men into Social Roles, 46 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 735, 735-54 (1984)
(describing stereotypical beliefs attributed to the sexes and tracing these beliefs to the
differing distribution of men and women in various social roles); Madeline E. Heilman,
Description and Prescription: How Gender Stereotypes Prevent Women’s Ascent up the
Organizational Ladder, 57 J. SOC. ISS. 657, 657-74 (2001) (arguing that gender stereotypes
lead to gender bias because of the discrepancy between stereotypes of women and the skills
viewed as necessary for upper-level management positions).
140. See e.g., Judith S. Bridges & Claire Etaugh, College Students’ Perceptions of
Mothers:
Effects of Maternal Employment-Childrearing Pattern and Motive for
Employment, 32 SEX ROLES 735, 747-48 (1995) (discussing studies in which mothers
continuously employed during pregnancy were seen as less committed than other
employees); Judith S. Bridges et. al, Trait Judgments of Stay-at-home and Employed
Parents: A Function of Social Role and/or Shifting Standards?, 26 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q.
140, 147-49 (2002) (discussing the perception that working mothers are less in communion
with their jobs and their children than working fathers); Amy J.C. Cuddy et al., When
Professionals Become Mothers, Warmth Doesn't Cut the Ice, 60 J. SOC. ISS. 701, 711-14
(2004) (discussing a loss in perceived confidence in women upon becoming mothers);
Claire Etaugh & Cara Moss, Attitudes of Employed Women Toward Parents Who Choose
Full-time or Part-time Employment Following Their Child’s Birth, 44 SEX ROLES 611, 61618 (2001) (discussing the perception that full-time employees experience more stress and
are less family-oriented than reduced-time employees); Claire Etaugh & Denise Folger,
Perceptions of Parents Whose Work and Parenting Behaviors Deviate from Role
Expectations, 39 SEX ROLES 215, 221-22 (1998) (investigating the perceptions of
employment status of parents following the birth of a child); Kathleen Fuegen et al.,
Mothers and Fathers in the Workplace: How Gender and Parental Status Influence
Judgments of Job-Related Competence, 60, J. SOC. ISSUES 737, 748-49 (2004) (discussing
the polarizing effects of parenthood and the judgment holding mothers to stricter
employment standards than fathers); Cecilia L. Ridgeway & Shelley J. Correll, Motherhood

196

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 11:1

research examining parental status and hiring decisions, application letters
were mailed to several accounting firms. Among other variables, the
applicant’s gender and parental status were manipulated. Employers were
less likely to contact mothers. However, fatherhood did not affect a male
applicant’s success. 141 Recent research found that mothers are less likely
than childless women to receive call-backs in response to job applications,
whereas fathers received more call-backs than childless men. 142 Negative
attitudes toward mothers may stem from the perception that employed
mothers deviate from gender expectations. Employed fathers, by contrast,
conform to the role of provider. 143 Arbitrators, acting upon such
stereotypes, may treat mothers more harshly and with less sympathy when
considering grievances.
On the other hand, the opposite may be true. Since family
interference with fathers’ work life violates societal expectations for men,
arbitrators may treat men more harshly while considering work life
grievances. For example, an arbitrator may view a father who refuses an
overtime shift because of childcare concerns more negatively than a
woman who does the same because childcare is not in the male domain. 144
Of course, the recent demographic changes in the workplace might
have influenced gender roles so that gender does not affect arbitrator
decision-making. Norms of fairness focus on the merits of a case rather
than the grievant’s individual attributes. Social psychology literature
suggests that factors such as gender play a smaller role in perceptions if
large amounts of individuating information are available. 145 For example,
as a Status Characteristic, 60 J. SOC. ISS. 683, 690-92 (2004) (citing studies that show that
college students perceive full-time employed mothers to be less committed, professional and
nurturing than their peers).
141. Michael Firth, Sex Discrimination in Job Opportunities for Women, 8 SEX ROLES
891, 898 (1982) (examining the extent of sex discrimination in the job market for
accountants).
142. Shelley J. Correll et al., Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Penalty?, 112 AM. J.
SOC. 1297 (2007) (discussing the substantial wage penalty suffered by mothers and
demonstrating hiring bias against mothers).
143. See, e.g., Bridges & Etaugh, supra note 140 at 39; Fuegen et al., supra note 140 at
40.
144. See, e.g., Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1047
(1994) (focusing on work-leave policies for fathers); Martin H. Malin Fathers and Parental
Leave Revisited, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 25 (1998) (exploring restrictions on work-leave
policies for fathers). See generally B. Ann Bettencourt et al., Evaluations of Ingroup and
Outgroup Members:
The Role of Category-Based Expectancy Violation, 33 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 244, (1997) (examining the role of category-based evaluation
and the effects of its violation).
145. See generally Ziva Kunda & Paul Thagard, Forming Impressions from Stereotypes,
Traits, and Behaviors: A Parallel-Constraint-Satisfaction Theory, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 284
(1996) (examining how stereotypes combine with other information about people to affect
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when all one knows about a worker is his or her gender, that knowledge
may guide evaluations in a stereotypical direction. But with a high degree
of knowledge about a worker’s performance, circumstances, etc., the role
of gender in an evaluation of that worker may weaken. Thus, while gender
stereotypes may generally lead a female worker to be evaluated more
negatively than a male worker, specific knowledge that a man and woman
both have good performance records (or bad performance records), for
example, typically results in judgments being driven largely by that
specific, individuating information and much less so by gender.
In short, the literature on how stereotypes guide judgments of others
provides abundant evidence that gender and other social category
memberships (e.g., race, age, socioeconomic status) can bias judgment in
stereotypical directions. At the same time, we know that gender
stereotypes can operate paradoxically, such that a father may be perceived
as a better parent than a mother (presumably because he is being evaluated
with respect to lower expectations for his group), that violations of gender
roles may harm both men and women, and that some situational factors
such as amount of knowledge may mitigate stereotyping effects. 146 The
external validity of much of the research supporting these conclusions is
questionable, however, because it has been carried out with samples of
undergraduates rather than with “real-world” decision makers such as
arbitrators, hence the focus of the present research.
Though not extensive, there is a literature that has focused specifically
on the role of grievant gender in the arbitration context. In one
experimental study, gender of both arbitrator and grievant had no impact on
judgments, 147 but in another study by the same authors, female grievants
were treated more favorably than male grievants, particularly by female
arbitrators. 148 Several published studies of actual arbitration decisions have

impressions).
146. See Diane Kobrynowicz & Monica Biernat, Decoding Subjective Evaluations: How
Stereotypes Provide Shifting Standards, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 579, 579-601
(1997) (examining how subjective evaluations relevant to stereotypes are translated into
open-ended descriptions, objective judgments, and Likert-type ratings); Ziva Kunda et al.,
Equal Ratings but Separate Meanings: Stereotypes and the Construal of Traits, 72 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 720, 720-34 (1997) (exploring the effects of stereotypes on
the meaning of traits used to describe groups and their members).
147. S. L. Oswald & S. B. Caudill, Experimental Evidence of Gender Effects in
Arbitration Decisions, 4 EMP. RESP. & RTS. J. 271 (1991) (discussing the arbitrator gender
and arbitrator-grievant gender effects on the decisions of arbitrators on a hypothetical sexual
harassment case).
148. S. B. Caudill & S. L. Oswald, A Sequential Selectivity Model of the Decisions of
Arbitrators, 14 MANAGERIAL & DEC. ECON. 261 (1993) (discussing the arbitrator gender and
arbitrator-grievant gender effects on the decisions of arbitrators on a hypothetical drugtesting case).
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also found that arbitrators treated female grievants more favorably than
male grievants, 149 with one finding no effects related to the grievant’s
gender. 150 However, these field studies typically have not controlled for
factors such as severity of the workplace offense. One field study which
did control for severity of offense found no gender effects in arbitrator
decision making, 151 but another doing the same found that female grievants
were less successful than male grievants. 152
A review of the published research specific to arbitral decisionmaking demonstrates mixed results regarding the effects of grievant
gender. The field studies that have been done are useful, but of course they
are limited in that case attributes vary tremendously and confounding
variables may exist between grievant demographics and case features, or
between arbitrator characteristics and case features, etc. The experimental
work that has been done is also limited in that predictors tend to be varied
only in isolation (as in studies that manipulate only grievant sex effects),
and testing of interactions between arbitrator and grievant features is rare.
The present research attempts to answer the questions left open by these
case studies and experiments.
In the research described below, we asked arbitrators to make
judgments in four cases, all relevant to work-family conflicts. In each case,
we varied other features of the grievant in addition to gender, such as
marital status and conflict based on child versus eldercare. This method
allows for determination of the relative weight of gender in arbitral
decision making compared to, and in interaction with, these other features.

149. Brian Bemmels, Gender Effects in Discharge Arbitration, 42 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REV. 63 (1988) (investigating statistics showing that female grievants were more likely to
have their grievances sustained than male grievants when the arbitrator was male); Brian
Bemmels, Gender Effects in Discipline Arbitration: Evidence from British Columbia, 31
ACAD.MGMT. J. 699 (1988) (discussing further evidence of gender bias in arbitration
results); Brian Bemmels, The Effect of Grievants’ Gender on Arbitration Decision, 41
Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 251 (1988) (discussing the role of gender in grievance arbitration).
150. Jack E. Steen et al., A Reexamination of Gender Bias in Arbitration Decisions, 45
LAB. L.J. 298 (1994) (focusing on gender bias in arbitration decisions considering an influx
of women into the market).
151. Dan R. Dalton et al., The ‘Iron Law of Paternalism’ in Employee Grievances and
Arbitration? A Comparison of Disciplinary and Nondisciplinary Cases, 10. EMP. RESP. &
RTS. J. 291 (1997) (finding that the results of arbitration show no statistically significant
dependence on the gender of the arbitrator).
152. Debra J. Mesch, Arbitration and Gender: An Analysis of Cases Taken to
Arbitration in the Public Sector, 24 J. COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
207 (1995) (showing data that indicates women tend to lose more cases and receive fewer
compromise outcomes than men in arbitrations).
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Study Methodology

Participants were 284 arbitrators (236 male, 48 female) who replied to
a request to participate in a study about arbitration decisions. The
population from which this sample was drawn included all 634 members
(as of fall 2004) of the National Academy of Arbitrators, 153 each of whom
received a solicitation letter by mail. This represents a response rate of
44.8%. 154
Participants could either complete the paper-and-pencil
instrument included with the solicitation letter or could choose to visit a
website that linked to an on-line version of the same instrument. Eightynine percent of respondents completed the paper-and-pencil version.
Each participant was exposed to four case vignettes, each depicting a
labor grievance, and was asked to render a judgment on the grievance (“I
would sustain the grievance in its entirety,” “I would sustain the grievance
in part,” or “I would not sustain the grievance”). Each of the four cases
involved an employee filing a grievance after being fired or suspended;
each case also kept the merits of the case constant but varied two important
details. First, in each case, the grievant was described as either a man or
woman (manipulation of “grievant sex”), and second, one other aspect of
each grievant’s background or history was manipulated. These four case
vignettes are described below:
Case One described a police officer (male or female) grieving a
suspension for insubordination after failing to report for duty eight hours
early because of childcare problems. For half of the respondents, the police
officer was depicted as a single parent; for the other half, as a married
parent (manipulation of grievant marital status).
Case Two described an employee (male or female) grieving his/her
firing after three occasions of refusing to work a second shift on overtime
on short notice. For half of the respondents, the employee refused overtime
because she or he was a single parent of two children and had been having
difficulties finding childcare on short notice; for the other half, because she

153. National Academy of Arbitrators Home Page, www.naarb.org (last visited Oct. 9,
2008). The National Academy of Arbitrators (NAA) represents the elite membership of
labor arbitrators in the United States and Canada. Applicants for NAA membership must
have a minimum number of years of arbitration experience, must have decided a minimum
number of cases in the five years preceding their applications, must demonstrate widespread
acceptability as reflected in the diversity of unions and employers selecting them for cases,
must receive outstanding references from NAA members, union advocates and management
advocates, and must agree to abide by the NAA’s Code of Professional Responsibility. It is
common for unions and employers to mandate NAA membership when selecting arbitrators
to hear their cases.
154. The population of arbitrators included 93 women and 541 men. Thus, the response
rate was higher for female arbitrators (51.6%) compared to male arbitrators (43.6%).
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or he was the primary caregiver for an elderly parent and had been having
difficulties finding elder care on short notice (manipulation of reason for
refusal to work overtime).
Case Three described a grievant (male or female) who was suspended
for insubordination after refusing to extend a work shift. For half of the
respondents, the grievant was depicted as wanting to attend his or her
child’s dance performance; for the other half, a prior commitment to help
move an elderly disabled neighbor into a nursing home that would be
difficult to reschedule was the reason for the refusal (manipulation of
reason for refusal to work overtime).
Case Four described a grievant (male or female) who had been fired
after using up FMLA leave and was still having difficulty with lateness and
missed work. This grievant was explicitly compared to two employees
who were coping with alcoholism for whom the employer had made special
concessions (and not fired). For half of the respondents, the grievant had
used up FMLA-guaranteed leave to care for a chronically sick child; for the
other half, the care was for a chronically sick elderly parent (manipulation
of type of family care).
Each arbitrator-participant was exposed to one version of each case.
Four sequences of cases were used in the manner depicted below, and
participants were randomly assigned to a sequence:

Sequence 1.
Sequence 2.
Sequence 3.
Sequence 4.

Case One
M- Married
F- Married
M- Single
F- Single

Case Two
F- Child
M- Parent
F- Parent
M- Child

Case Three
M- Neighbor
F- Child
M- Child
F- Neighbor

Case Four
F- Child
M- Parent
F- Parent
M- Child

After rendering a decision on each case, participants were also asked
to judge the blameworthiness of the grievant as well as rate their level of
sympathy for the grievant’s case. Because these judgments generally
followed the same pattern as the decisions, they will not be discussed here.
At the end of the questionnaire, participants also answered a number of
demographic questions. The mean age of the sample was 65 (range from
39 – 93); the mean years of experience in arbitration was 28.5 years (range
from 5 – 58); the mean political affiliation value was 3.10 (on a scale
ranging from 1=liberal to 7=conservative). Roughly 64% of the sample
practiced arbitration full-time; the most common industries represented
were manufacturing (55%), public sector (44%), education (38%), and
transit (33%).
For each case, decisions were converted into a scale ranging from 1-3,
where 1 was a decision not to sustain a grievance, 2 was sustenance in part,
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and 3 was sustenance of the grievance in its entirety. We then computed 2
(sex of grievant) × 2 (other manipulated factor) Analyses of Variance
(ANOVAs) on this decision variable, for each case. Analysis of Variance
is a statistical procedure that tests for mean differences among conditions.
Specifically, it indicates the effects of each manipulated variable as an
independent “main effect” (e.g., a main effect of grievant sex would
indicate that the mean decision differed for men and women, regardless of
the other manipulated factor), as well as the “interaction” between the
manipulated variables. For example, an interaction between grievant sex
and the other factor—say, marital status—would indicate that the mean
decision differed somewhere among the four “cells” of the sex by marital
status matrix. Alternatively, the effect of gender might differ when parents
are presented as single versus married, or the effect of marital status might
differ for men versus women. Whenever a significant interaction was
found in the analyses reported below, follow-up tests were used to pinpoint
the source of the effect and to determine which cell (or cells) in the matrix
was “driving” the interaction.
C.

Results

Case One, the married/single, male/female police officer, was based
on the facts of Town of Stratford, discussed earlier. 155 Although the
arbitrator in that case denied the grievance, only 19.4% of the arbitrators in
our study agreed. Almost half (49.1%) responded that they would sustain
the grievance completely and almost another third (31.5%) would have
sustained the grievance in part.
Decisions on this case were submitted to a Grievant Sex by Marital
Status Analysis of Variance. Only the main effect of Marital Status was
significant, albeit at what is considered a “marginal level” (F(1,269) = 3.05,
p < .08). Overall, arbitrators were more favorable toward (more likely to
sustain the grievance of) a married parent grievant (M = 2.38, SD = .75)
than a single parent grievant (M = 2.21, SD = .79). Though the interaction
with parent sex was not significant, the relevant means are graphically
presented in Figure 1, where the y-axis depicts the mean decision value
ranging from 1 (do not sustain grievance) to 3 (sustain in its entirety) on the
scale described above. As can be seen, the tendency for more negative
decisions for single relative to married parents held both when the parent
was male and female. To put this in more concrete terms, arbitrators
sustained the grievance in its entirety 54% of the time when the grievant

155. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text (discussing Town of Stratford in
detail).
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was married, compared to 44% of the time when the grievant was a single
parent.
Figure 1: Grievance decisions in Case 1, by grievant sex and marital
status.

3
Decision to 2.5
Sustain
2
Grievance 1.5

Single Parent
Married Parent

1
Male

Female

Grievant Sex

Case Two, the single mother/father of two young children or the
primary caregiver of a chronically ill elderly parent, was based on
Rochester Psychiatric Center. 156 Although the arbitrator in that case
opined that no arbitrator would uphold discharge on those facts, 44.8% of
our sample disagreed and indicated that they would deny the grievance.
Another 32.1% responded that they would sustain the grievance in part and
only 23.1% indicated that they would sustain the grievance completely.
We computed a Grievant Sex × Reason for Refusal (child care/elder
care) ANOVA on grievance decisions in this case. No effects were
significant (all Fs < 1). But when the sex of the arbitrator was also
included in this analysis, a reliable two-way interaction emerged between
the sex of the arbitrator and the reason for the refusal to work overtime
(F(1,269) = 4.82, p < .05). As depicted in Figure 2, among male
arbitrators, there was no evidence of differential decision-making based on
grievant features. However, among female arbitrators, there was a reliable
tendency to render less favorable judgments for grievants with childcare
difficulties than for grievants with eldercare difficulties (F(1,269) = 5.65, p
< .02). More specifically, female arbitrators decided entirely in favor of
grievants with eldercare concerns 40.7% of the time, compared to 14.3% in
favor of grievants with childcare concerns.

156. See supra notes 127-36 and accompanying text (discussing Rochester Psychiatric
Center in detail).
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Figure 2: Grievance decisions in Case 2, by arbitrator sex and
child/elder care
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Case Three presented the male/female employee who refused
overtime to attend a child’s dance recital or to help an elderly neighbor
move into a nursing home. The largest group, 41.1% of respondents,
denied the grievance. Those that sustained the grievance were divided
almost equally: 29.6% sustained completely and 29.3% sustained in part.
A Grievant Sex × Reason for Refusal ANOVA indicated a main effect
of reason for refusal (F(1,269) = 4.46, p < .05). Arbitrators were more
sympathetic to a grievant who refused overtime to help a neighbor (M =
2.01, SD = .81) than to one who refused overtime to attend a child’s dance
recital (M = 1.79, SD = .84). This may not be surprising as the case for
helping the neighbor move is perhaps more compelling. It was a one-time
event and could not be rescheduled easily; in contrast, one might
reasonably assume that there would be future dance recitals to attend.
An additional analysis that also included the sex of the arbitrator
revealed a reliable three-way interaction (F(1,272) = 4.04, p < .05).
Among male arbitrators, the tendency to favor grievants helping neighbors
relative to those attending a dance recital remained significant (F(1,272) =
5.65, p < .05) but the sex of the grievant had no effect on judgments. Male
arbitrators ruled entirely in the grievant’s favor 34.3% of the time when the
refusal reason was moving a neighbor, compared to 24.8% of the time
when the reason was attending a dance recital. Among female arbitrators,
however, the interaction between grievant sex and reason for refusal was
significant (F(1,272) = 3.98, p < .05). This interaction is depicted in
Figure 3, where it is clear that male grievants were favored when they
refused overtime to attend a dance recital compared to when they helped a
neighbor, but female grievants were favored when they moved a neighbor
relative to when they attended a dance recital. Simple effects analyses
indicated that these individual trends were not statistically reliable
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(presumably because of the small sample of female arbitrators).
Nonetheless, female arbitrators sustained the grievance in its entirety 50%
of the time when the male grievant attended a dance recital (but only 16.7%
of the time when he helped a neighbor move), and 44.4% of the time when
the female grievant moved a neighbor (but only 28.5% of the time when
she attended a dance recital). Again, among male arbitrators, those who
refused overtime to help an elderly neighbor were favored over dance
recital attendees, regardless of grievant sex.

Figure 3: Grievance decisions in Case 3, by grievant sex and
reason for overtim e refusal, fem ale arbitrators only
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Case Four, the male/female employee with the chronically ill
child/parent, injected an element not present in the other cases. The
grievant was compared to other employees who (1) had similar attendance
difficulties; (2) attributed those difficulties to alcoholism; and (3) were not
fired when they sought help for their addictions. In this case, 30.4% of
responding arbitrators indicated that they would sustain the grievance
completely, 45.6% would sustain the grievance in part and 23.9% would
deny the grievance.
We analyzed decisions on the target’s grievance using a Grievant Sex
X Type of Care (elder, child) ANOVA. A main effect of type of care
emerged (F(1,269) = 4.86, p < .05). Arbitrators were more likely to find in
favor of the grievant when s/he was caring for a chronically sick child (M =
2.18, SD = .73) than when he or she was caring for a chronically sick
parent (M = 1.98, SD = .73). Figure 4 depicts the means separately for
female and male grievants, but it is clear that the sex of the grievant made
no difference in these decisions. Overall, arbitrators found in favor of the
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childcare provider 37% of the time but in favor of the eldercare provider
only 25.5% of the time.
Figure 4: Grievance decisions in Case 4, by grievant sex and
type of care being provided
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Interestingly, there were no significant differences between eldercare
and childcare providers in the tendency to sustain grievances in part. Of
arbitrators presented with a grievant who had a sick child, 44.1% sustained
in part. Compare this to arbitrators presented with a grievant with a sick
parent, which were sustained in part 46.9% of the time. It is very likely
that arbitrators sustaining the grievance in part viewed it as a case of
disparate treatment and intended to reduce the discipline to a measure
comparable to that given the two employees whose absenteeism was due to
alcoholism. Thus, the impact of childcare versus eldercare responsibilities
seemed to matter among arbitrators who viewed the case independently of
the alcoholic employees and either sustained the grievance entirely or
denied it.
An additional analysis that included sex of the arbitrator revealed a
tendency for female arbitrators to rule in favor of the grievant more often
than male arbitrators (regardless of grievant attributes F(1,268) = 4.93, p <
.05, Ms = 2.27 and 2.03, respectively). That is, across all versions of this
case, female arbitrators sustained the grievance in its entirety 41.7% of the
time, while male arbitrators did so 28.5% of the time.
In addition to gender, we also considered whether other demographic
features of arbitrators played a role in their decision-making. Eighty-five
percent of the arbitrators in this sample were parents. Perhaps because of
this skew, we found no evidence that parental status mattered for decision
making in any of these cases (all relevant ps > .27).
On average, the arbitrators had 28.5 years of experience (SD = 9.23,
range = 5 - 58 years). Female arbitrators (M = 23.6 years, SD = 7.38) not
only had significantly less experience than male arbitrators (M = 29.4
years, SD = 9.26, t(255) = 3.74, p < .01), but were younger as well (M =

206

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 11:1

59.8 versus 66.2, p < .01).
For each of the four cases, we entered the two manipulated case
variables (e.g., sex and marital status in Case One), years of experience in
arbitration (centered), and all possible interactions (with arbitrator sex as a
covariate) into a multiple regression equation. In two cases (Cases 1 and
3), experience affected arbitrator decision making. 157
Specifically, in Case One, the three-way interaction between sex of
grievant, marital status of grievant, and arbitrator experience was
significant (B = .05, SE = .02, t(245) = 2.02, p < .05). 158 We decomposed
this interaction by conducting Grievant Marital Status × Experience
regressions within each level of grievant sex, and found no effects in the
case of female grievants, ps > .25 (see top panel of Figure 5), but a reliable
two-way interaction in the case of male grievants, B = .03, SE = .02, t(117)
= 1.99, p < .05 (see bottom panel). Simple slopes analysis indicated that
this interaction was driven by the effect of marital status among arbitrators
with low experience: married male grievants were particularly likely to be
favored over single male grievants when arbitrators had little experience (B
= -.52, SE = .25, t(244) = 2.05, p < .05). No other simple slope effects
were significant (ps > .14) though there was a trend for married male
grievants also to be favored over married female grievants among those
with low arbitration experience (p = .12).

157. We also found some evidence that political ideology (liberalism or conservatism)
moderated judgments, with liberals tending to favor female over male grievants and
conservatives tending to favor male over female grievants, particularly when childcare
issues were involved. For a full report of these findings, see Monica Biernat & Martin H.
Malin, Political Ideology and Labor Arbitrators’ Decision-Making in Work-Family Conflict
Cases, 34 PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 880 (2008).
158. This effect remained significant when age was controlled for in the analysis. When
age was substituted for experience in the regression, the comparable Age × Grievant Sex ×
Marital Status interaction was not significant, p > .90. This suggests that the effect was
driven by arbitration experience and not by age.
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Figure 5. Arbitration experience as a predictor of grievance decisions,
by grievant sex and marital status, Case One
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In Case Three, grievance decisions were affected by Arbitration
Experience as a main effect (B = .02, SE = .01, t(244) = 2.26, p < .03) and
by the Experience × Reason interaction (B = -.04, SE = .02, t(244) = 2.83,
p < .01). 160 As can be seen in Figure 6, arbitration experience predicted

159. Values are plotted in Figures using the value of the continuous variable, experience,
set at one standard deviation above and below the mean.
160. This effect remained significant when age was controlled in the regression. But
when age replaced experience in a comparable regression equation, the Age × Reason
interaction was also significant, p < .01. Thus, this effect is not uniquely attributable to
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increased likelihood of sustaining a grievance for workers who refused
overtime to help move an elderly neighbor (simple slope B = .02, SE = .01,
t(244) = 2.28, p < .02) but insignificantly less likelihood of sustaining a
grievance for workers who refused overtime to attend a child’s dance
recital (p > .40). This interaction was also driven by the significant effect
of reason for refusal to work overtime among those with greater arbitration
experience (B = -.84, SE = .27, t(244) = 3.10, p < .01), an effect that was
marginally significant (and reversed) among those with less arbitration
experience (B = .45, SE = .26, t(244) = 1.72, p < .09).

Decision to sustain grievance .

Decision to sustain grievance .

Figure 6. Arbitration experience as a predictor of decision-making,
by reason for refusal to work overtime, Case Three
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experience but rather could equally well be termed an age effect. Indeed, the fact that those
who helped the elderly were judged favorably by elder arbitrators may make self-interest a
viable explanation for this effect.
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IV. ANALYSIS
As a primary finding, this study determined that straightforward
gender bias is largely absent from arbitration decisions. The only case
where the grievant’s gender made a difference in the likely outcome of the
grievance was Case Three, and then only for female arbitrators. However,
because of the small sample size of female arbitrators, the result was not
statistically significant.
On the other hand, our study revealed potential implicit bias against
single parents. In Case One, if arbitrators had differentiated among
grievants based on marital status, we would have intuitively expected them
to favor single parents, on the assumption that married parents might have
called on their spouses for assistance in order to work the emergency callin. Yet arbitrators’ reactions were completely opposite to this intuitive
hunch, treating the single parents significantly more negatively than the
married parents. This was particularly so when arbitrators with relatively
less experience in labor arbitration judged male grievants. Police officers
who are single fathers may be unusual or contrary to the occupational
“prototype.” This bias may therefore reflect animosity toward the atypical
worker, a bias that was overcome among those with more arbitration
experience.
Arbitral experience also played a significant role in Case Three, where
increased experience enhanced the tendency to favor the neighbor-helping
grievant. If one argues that it is unreasonable to be biased against single
parents but reasonable to favor an employee who makes a one-time, timeconstrained commitment to help a needy neighbor, the results can be
construed as indicating that arbitration experience increased reasonable
decision-making. It is interesting to note, however, that when the grievant
was male, female arbitrators favored the father choosing to attend his
daughter’s dance recital over the neighbor-helper (see Figure 3). This
reversal may reflect female arbitrators’ greater receptivity to (and
appreciation of) men acting outside of traditional gender roles. 161
Interestingly, past research that has specifically examined how female
arbitrators respond to female versus male grievants has typically found no
gender differences. 162 But our data suggest that female arbitrators may
161. Mary E. Kite, Changing Times, Changing Gender Roles: Who Do We Want Women
and Men To Be?, HANDBOOK OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN AND GENDER 215-27

(Rhoda K. Unger ed. 2004).
162 See Brian Bemmels, Gender Effects in Discharge Arbitration, 42 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 63 (1988); William J. Bigoness, & Philip B. Dubose, Effects of Gender on
Arbitrators’ Decisions. 28 ACAD. MGMT. J., 485 (1985); Clyde Scott & Elizabeth Shadoan,
The Impact of Gender on Arbitration Decisions, 10 J. LAB. RESEARCH 429 (1989).
162 See Brian Bemmels, Gender Effects in Discharge Arbitration, 42 INDUS. & LAB.
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demonstrate a more nuanced form of gender bias in their favoring of
nontraditional men.
Our findings in Case Four reflect that among arbitrators who did not
analyze the case as one of disparate treatment vis-à-vis the two alcoholic
grievants, there was significant bias favoring grievants with sick children
over grievants with sick parents. Unlike Case One, arbitrator experience
did not mitigate the resulting bias. Yet, unlike Case Three, one cannot say
objectively that the case of the grievant caring for the sick child was more
compelling than the case of the grievant caring for the sick parent. These
data may indicate that providing eldercare is unlikely to evoke much
sympathy when given as an explanation for work-family conflict.
However, female arbitrators, overall, were more sympathetic to the Case
Four grievant, regardless of the kind of care (child or elder) that the
grievant was providing. This effect may be based in the reality of women’s
greater involvement in all care giving roles relative to men’s involvement.
What may explain the overall absence of bias based on grievant
gender but the presence of bias based on grievant marital status? Further,
what may explain the difference in bias depending on whether the caregiver
is caring for a child or a parent? It is likely that arbitrators and professional
adjudicators such as judges and administrative agency personnel have a
heightened awareness of the potential for gender and/or racial and ethnic
bias. Awareness of the potential for bias plays a major role in combating it.
On the other hand, there is probably minimal, if any, awareness among
arbitrators of the potential for bias either against single parents or in favor
of childcare givers over eldercare givers. 163
Our study shows that awareness and experience may mitigate
cognitive biases affecting adjudicative decision-making. But how can
cognitive biases be lessened among inexperienced adjudicators such as
jurors? Professor Jody Armour has urged that attorneys be allowed to
comment directly on parties’ and witnesses’ races to counteract potential
racial biases implicit in jurors. 164 Additionally, a more systematic method

REL. REV. 63 (1988); William J. Bigoness, & Philip B. Dubose, Effects of Gender on
Arbitrators’ Decisions. 28 ACAD. MGMT. J., 485 (1985); Clyde Scott & Elizabeth Shadoan,
The Impact of Gender on Arbitration Decisions, 10 J. LAB. RESEARCH 429 (1989).
163. Studies of judges have shown how the use of cognitive shortcuts can lead to
erroneous decision-making. See Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges
Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 13-29 (2007) (hypothesizing that judges may make
decisions using their intuitive system, which may lead to erroneous or unjust results); Chris
Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 784-821 (2001) (using an
empirical study to show that judges may use heuristics to make decisions, which may be
erroneous).
164. Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the
Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 733, 768-70 (1995).
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of heightening juror awareness of the potential for cognitive biases may
prove successful. For example, the standard orientation given to jurors
could include a discussion of cognitive biases and implicit stereotyping.
Finally, a closing caveat to our study should be mentioned. Our study
presented arbitrators with much more limited case information than they
would normally receive in actual grievance hearings and the consequences
of their decisions were only hypothetical. This artificiality may limit our
ability to generalize our findings. Nevertheless, the experimental method
used in our study has many advantages over field studies, most notably the
ability to carefully control case features and isolate their effects. The
arbitrators in our study seemed to take the cases seriously as well, often
offering lengthy explanations for their decisions.
V.

CONCLUSION

We began our study with a consideration of stereotyping and the
tendency for individuals to demonstrate bias without awareness. Concerns
about the effects of gender bias in the context of the changing
demographics of the workplace and the difficulties of balancing work and
family life prompted our study of labor arbitrators. These difficulties can
give rise to problems in the workplace, such as poor attendance, tardiness,
lack of availability, and lack of flexibility, that may result in suspension or
discharge; this may lead to grievances that eventually find their way to a
group of important decision-makers, labor arbitrators. Our study question
centered on whether features of the grievants and the labor arbitrators
themselves mattered for the outcomes of these cases.
Our findings point to the complexity of the decision-making process
and the fact that biases reveal themselves in subtle rather than
straightforward ways. By examining decision-making in four cases, we
tested whether one particular type of arbitrator tended to have more or less
bias than another, simply based on their arbitrator characteristics. We did
not find such a result. Instead, arbitrator characteristics sometimes
predicted decision-making, but were dependent on other features of the
case such as the sex of the grievant and/or the nature of the workplace
problem, and attributes of the arbitrator, such as his or her sex and/or
previous arbitration experience.
These findings resonate with the broader social psychological
literature that emphasizes the situational sensitivity of discrimination and
bias. Situational norms, 165 the nature of the judgment of decision, 166 and
165. Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racism, in
PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 61, 66-73 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner
eds., 1986).
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the quality and quantity of additional information about a target 167 have all
been found to moderate the extent to which stereotyping based on social
category membership occurs. The present results point to the importance
of using more complex research designs to study adjudicator decisionmaking and, more generally, of taking a more nuanced approach to
understanding when and how attributes of the decision-maker may produce
biased decisions.

166. Monica Biernat, Toward a Broader View of Social Stereotyping, 58 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 1019, 1020-24(1993).
167. Ziva Kunda & Paul Thagard, Forming Impressions from Stereotypes, Traits, and
Behaviors: A Parallel-Constraint- Satisfaction Theory, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 284, 289-91
(1996).
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APPENDIX
Case vignettes (with italicized font indicating variations across
conditions).
Case One:
Grievant was a male/female police officer for a mid-sized municipality
who was called in early on emergency overtime. Grievant was called at
11:00 a.m. and ordered to report at noon. Grievant’s usual start time was 8
p.m. Grievant refused the order because she/he did not have childcare
available (grievant was a married parent of a two-year-old; his wife/her
husband was unavailable to care for the child/a single parent of a two-year
old). Grievant made several phone calls to neighbors, friends, and his/her
regular childcare provider trying to find childcare but was unable to do so.
Grievant called the supervisor and explained the situation and the
supervisor ordered him/her to report at noon. Grievant continued to look
for childcare and finally reached his/her regular childcare provider who
said she could arrive at Grievant’s home by 5:45 p.m. Grievant reported at
6 p.m. She/He was suspended for insubordination.
Case Two:
Grievant was the primary caregiver for his/her chronically ill elderly
parent/was a single mother/father of two children, ages three and five, who
worked the 3:00 - 11:20 p.m. shift at a hospital. Mandatory overtime
rotated among all employees. Grievant knew when his/her name reached
the top of the rotation list but did not know when she/he would be asked for
overtime. There was no discernable pattern to when the employer required
overtime. Determination of the need for overtime, usually a second eight
hour shift, was made late in the shift and Grievant was unable to obtain
substitute care for his/her parent/child on such short notice. Grievant
explained the situation to his/her supervisor who replied, “You know the
system. You’ll just have to find a way to cover it.” Grievant refused to
work the overtime and was reprimanded. Grievant attempted to find
individuals who could be available to watch his/her parent/his/her children
overnight on very short notice but was unsuccessful. His/Her regular
caregiver/sitter told him/her she could not stay beyond 1:00 a.m. unless she
had two weeks’ notice. Grievant advised his/her supervisor who repeated
that Grievant would have to find a way to fulfill his/her job responsibilities.
Grievant refused the mandatory overtime a second time and was
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When Grievant refused a third time, the employer fired

Case Three:
Contract requires Employer to equalize overtime, both voluntary
and mandatory. Employer must offer overtime on a voluntary basis to
employees beginning with those who worked the least amount of overtime;
if no one volunteers, Employer may force overtime on employees with the
least amount of overtime and the least amount of seniority. Grievant had
the least amount of overtime and the least amount of seniority and she/he
was ordered to extend his/her shift by four hours. She/He refused because
{she/he had made a commitment to help his/her disabled neighbor move
into a nursing home that evening. For the past four years, Grievant had
cared for his/her neighbor who had no family members living nearby.
Finally, Grievant persuaded the neighbor’s two children to move their
father to a nursing home but the children agreed to do so only if Grievant
would oversee the move. Because of the nursing home’s requirements, the
move had to be arranged three weeks in advance and if it did not take place
on the scheduled day, it could not be rescheduled for another month.}/
{his/her 10-year old daughter was performing in a dance recital that
evening at her school. This performance was very important to the child
and Grievant had promised to attend.} Grievant explained the situation to
his/her supervisor and offered to work the next time overtime was required.
The supervisor replied, “The contract requires you to work overtime now.”
Grievant refused. Employer forced the next person on the overtime list and
suspended Grievant for insubordination.
Case Four:
The employer’s attendance control plan assessed occurrence points for
tardiness, early departure, unexcused absence and failure to call in when
absent or late. After accruing four points, an employee received a verbal
warning. After six points, the employee received a written warning. After
eight points, the employee received a one-day suspension and a final
warning. After ten points, the employee was subject to discharge. When
an employee reached ten points, a meeting was convened between the
employee and a union representative to discuss whether the employee
would be discharged. In most cases, the employer discharged the
employee. However, in two cases, the employees admitted at the meeting
that their absences resulted from alcohol abuse and that they were at their
wits’ end and needed help. In each case, the employer referred the
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employee to the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) and agreed that if
the employee completed the EAP and complied with all the after-care
requirements of the EAP counselor, the employee would be reinstated
without back pay on a last chance basis.
The female/male Grievant, whose job tenure was comparable to that of
the two employees discussed above, accumulated ten points, largely for
tardiness. Grievant had a child/cared for a parent who developed a severe
case of Hepatitis. The child’s/parent’s condition deteriorated necessitating
hospitalization and eventually a donor liver was located and the
child/parent received a liver transplant. The child/parent was hospitalized
for two months and Grievant was granted and used FMLA leave for the
entire period. Grievant continued to use FMLA leave to assist her/his
child/parent. Upon exhausting her/his twelve weeks of FMLA leave,
Grievant returned to work.
Grievant began accumulating attendance points within a few weeks of
returning to work. When she/he accumulated ten points, the employer
called a meeting with Grievant and a union representative. At the meeting,
Grievant indicated that his/her record of tardiness was due to his/her
having to care for his/her chronically ill child/parent. Grievant related that
his/her child/parent would suffer relapse attacks with no prior warning and
Grievant would rush the child/parent to the emergency room and be up
most of the night. Grievant’s shift began at 6:00 a.m. and, on a sufficient
number of occasions, Grievant was unable to get to work on time or to
come to work at all after being awake most of the night. Grievant always
called in when she/he was going to be absent or tardy. Grievant said that
she/he did not know what to do and asked for help with the situation. The
union asked the employer to investigate what resources might be available
to assist Grievant but the employer decided to terminate his/her
employment. The employer rejected the union’s suggestion that Grievant’s
situation was comparable to that of the employees with alcohol problems
who were not discharged.

